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In December 2015, Engseng Ho visited Leiden University as the keynote speaker for
the Ocean of Law conference. Two years later we reconnected for a conversation
about his career, the study of diasporas, the legal history of the Indian Ocean world,
and his fascination with inter-Asian connections.
Engseng Ho is professor of cultural anthropology and history at Duke University,
MuhammadAlagil distinguished visiting professor of Arabia Asia Studies at the Asia
Research Institute, and the director of the Middle East Institute at the National
University of Singapore. He was previously professor of anthropology at Harvard
University and senior scholar at the Harvard Academy. After graduating from
Stanford with undergraduate degrees in economics and anthropology, Ho spent a few
years as an international economist in Singapore before pursuing aMaster’s and PhD
at the University of Chicago. His works have been central to the field of Indian Ocean
Studies, especially regarding the international and transcultural dimensions of
Islamic societies across the Indian Ocean and their relations with Western empires.
You were born and brought up in Penang, a city built on its transnational
and multiethnic maritime roots. Did this inform your childhood and later
intellectual journeys?
I think all my work has the hidden agenda of making a name for my home island,
which became a backwater in the 1970s and ’80s. When I grew up in Malaysia, there
were always racial conflicts among Malays, Chinese, and Indians. The ruling party
was a combination of race-based parties. I was brought up to think that different
races don’t get along and that there is an inherent conflict in a racial situation. But
actually in Penang itself, the situation was quite different. There were Penangite
Chinese, who are called Baba or Peranakan, descended from Chinese mixed with
locals. You also had a lot of Indian Muslims, who became Malay.
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There is a term called masuk melayu: you can become Malay over a couple of
generations. Many people who were known as Malays in Penang were not in fact of
indigenous descent, including some of the top politicians such as Anwar Ibrahim, and
Mahathir Mohamad in Kedah. There were many cases where Malay women were
Chinese who had been adopted by Malay families, or where people who were quite
Chinese-looking were of mixed descent. Also, in each town of Malaysia, especially
among the Chinese, one dialect dominates the others. In Penang it was Hokkien,
which the Indians and the Malays also spoke.1
Altogether, the racial view of the country was not what we experienced in Penang,
but we did not have the language to think about it in a different way. Penang is what
I now know to be a typical port-city emporium in the Indian Ocean. That is the
experience I grew up with. But of course I didn’t have any comparative idea of what
all that meant. The other thing about Penang is that it is an island with nice beaches.
Every holiday we went camping by the beach, and in school we built our own kayaks
from wood. I grew up swimming and I was a competitive swimmer. I suppose later on
in my career those two things came together: the multiculturalism of Penang and the
experience of the sea.
In the mid-1980s, you moved to the US for your undergraduate studies at
Stanford University. How was the experience of encountering a completely
distant and different land? Did you feel yourself being part of a diaspora at
the time?
When I went to the US my idea was to study for four years and then go back home.
I used to love building things from scratch or from bits and pieces of broken toys, so
I thought I would be an engineer. The main goal of going to university abroad was to
be able to make a living and have my parents stop worrying about me. Engineering
was good because it combined my interests and theirs. But none of that happened.
When I went to college, I had never thought of myself as very studious. In the
British school system you don’t study until the end of the year. I wasn’t used to
studying all the time. But one thing that I found interesting was to read people like
Durkheim in classical sociology. It was a shock to me that people wrote books
about things that I knew and had been thinking about for a long time. When I read
Durkheim on reification in religion and the idea that God is the image of human
beings projected onto a higher plane, I wanted to write home to my friends who were
Christians to tell them they had got it all wrong and that there was a rational
explanation for what they had misconstrued. Growing up in Malaysia, ideas and
intellectual life were quite marginal to me. It was a commercialised place, business is
big there. The world of ideas was therefore stunningly new to me.
Initially I was also interested in psychology. I wanted to understand people and
I thought psychology was the solution. It turned out that psychology was full of
statistics and regressions, which I did not find very insightful. I was then lucky to take
a one-year intensive course on Western civilisation, from the Greeks to the medieval
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ages to the modern period. It gave me a very strong sense of the intellectual history of
Western thought. It was just mind-opening and gave me a real sense of the con-
textualisation of ideas. That somehow seemed a useful way to think about things
which were happening in a completely different part of the world.
After your undergraduate studies you worked in the financial sector for some
time in Singapore. How then did this thought process lead to an intellectual
transition?
After all this intellectual stimulation I was no longer interested in doing engineering,
and I ended up taking a lot of other classes—I actually took all the classes on
Marxism offered on campus. Most of those classes turned out to be in anthropology.
I also did a lot of courses in economics and the history of economic thought. I added a
few more classes in micro- and macroeconomics, and that lead to majors in both
economics and anthropology. But I must say that what I liked in engineering was the
systematic thought: you put many pieces together and if you do it well, things work.
I used to build little toys with electric motors. Anthropology and economics are
actually very much like that as well. In economics, what I liked was macroeconomics
and how all the different parts, such as investment, consumption, and government
spending, interact with each other. Classic anthropology used to be very systematic as
well, with all the different dimensions of society, such as religion, politics, economy,
and ideas, interacting in a living culture. I naturally went after those kinds of
interactions.
When I went back to Malaysia after graduation, I was visiting some friends at the
National University of Singapore when I met a professor in the photocopying room. He
asked me what I was doing. When I said I had just returned from the US after gradu-
ating, he said: “Weneed someone to teach computer programming, can you do it?” I told
him that I took one course in programming but dropped it, but he said: “I am sure you
can do it, you are from a good California university.” Two weeks later, I was teaching
programming. It was nerve-wracking. After a while, I decided that I had spent too much
time in the university, and that I should be outside. So I got a job in the government
investment corporation and the central bank. I worked there as a international macro-
economist, predicting interest rates, charting exchange and inflation rates. It was exhi-
larating and challenging for someone fresh from college, because I had to interpret the
latest numbers to tough top officials: this goes up, so that goes down. I did that for about
two years, and then decided to go back to university.
What did motivate you towards studying diaspora?
The way I got interested in diaspora is very simple. I had the chance to do some
summer research as an undergraduate and I went to one of my advisers, G. William
Skinner, who was a well-known anthropologist of both China and the overseas
Chinese. I said to him that I would like to do a project on the Cape Malays in South
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Africa. That sort of choice was quite typical for me: something I knew, which was to say
Malays, but in a very different place that I did not know. It was a contrast between
familiar and unfamiliar. But he said, you know what, summer is a short time, it would
take time for you to get to know the place, so why don’t you go back toMalaysia? I was
hugely disappointed but I went back to Penang and studied the Baba (or Peranakan)
Chinese. Through this research, I learned all sorts of things about this community, which
did not sit quite right with the dominant racial views of the country. They were proud to
be British subjects, and they were Anglicised Chinese. Their association in Penang was
called SCBA, which stood for the Straits Chinese British Association, but people called it
the Straits Chinese Baba Association. Whether they were Baba or British, the basic issue
is why this mixed Malay-Chinese population identified primarily with the British. That
was strange when you think in terms of identity.
The question of the Baba kept nagging me and I did a lot of fieldwork. I also
collected materials from associations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies. From that point on it was a combination of fieldwork and historical work.
I found out that the best way to understand the strange situation of Baba being Baba
and British is actually a historical one. Only with seeing how things change over time
can you recognise these strange mixtures which become something so real that people
don’t know what is up and what is down. The research ended up being a story of
the racialisation of Malaysia under British rule.2 What was initially multiethnic
conglomerates competing with each other became parcelled out into individual races
under colonial administration.
Why did you then move away from the Malay-Chinese communities?
I think there is a link between this Baba story and how I got into the Hadramis,
because both communities were very similar. While studying the Chinese in Malay-
sia, I was also looking at the Chinese across Southeast Asia as part of a larger
diaspora. In places like Thailand and the Philippines they integrated so well into
society that many of them became political leaders and rulers. In other places, like
Indonesia, the Chinese were assimilating successfully until roughly the beginning of
Dutch rule. Then the assimilation process was interrupted by colonial government,
and Baba Peranakan emerged as distinct communities. Something similar happened
in Malaya. Later on with the arrival of totoks (migrant Chinese) in the twentieth
century, you have a re-Sinicisation. In these processes, at one point people from
abroad integrate and assimilate, at some other point they become a third or creole
community, and at yet another point they become racialised again. This was an
analysis which William Skinner had put forward in his writings. That wider view of
diaspora and how it can have different historical outcomes in different places and
times was quite liberating intellectually, because it meant that you are not necessarily
stuck in the position you find yourself in in a certain decade or place. It opened my
mind up to all these different kinds of possibilities which exist either when you go
back in the past or when you go sideways to a different country.
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At some point I realised that there also were these Hadrami Arabs prominent in
Southeast Asia who could also be thought of as a diaspora. In certain places like
Malaysia they are considered Malay and are part of the elite, as descendants of the
Prophet. In other places like the Philippines, they might be part of theMuslim groups
who had been considered rebels ever since the Spaniards were there. In southern
Thailand, some might be associated with Muslim separatists. In Indonesia, the
situation is more mixed. Some of them became sultans of polities like Pontianak and
Siak. In other places or times, native politicians such as Sukarno would be unhappy
with them as people whomake use of religion for their own purposes. So the Hadrami
Arabs were quite similar to the overseas Chinese, having all kinds of different
experiences across the region.
I wanted a way to compare and contrast their experiences with the Chinese, the
Dutch, the English, and the Portuguese in the region. The Portuguese were also very
well integrated in the Indian Ocean. Initially they felt that they were not climatically
adjusted to the tropics. They became interested in tropical plants, which they ate,
thinking to ingest as well the climatic and organismic elements of the region. They
also intermarried with locals, thinking that their bodies would become acclimatised
by intermixing with locals from the tropics. The Dutch also intermixed until roughly
about 1800. There was a lot of intermarriage between the Dutch and the natives.
Other Europeans used to make fun of it as the Dutch going native. It was only in the
nineteenth century that it became all racially oriented and more concerned with
preserving their racial identity. In Southeast Asia, we see all these different diasporas
meeting and overlapping. The Arabs were one of them, but also the Chinese, the
Dutch, the Malayalis, Tamils, Gujaratis, and Bengalis.
In your work there is a strict divide between the European colonisers
on the one hand and Indian Ocean diaspora groups on the other. You write,
“Europeans brought only their genes. Hadramis carried along their
genealogies as well.” Would a less strict divide be possible and perhaps
informative as well?
In terms of a strict divide, if you think of independence in Malaysia and Indonesia,
the Dutch were kicked out as foreign occupiers. Some Chinese were considered for-
eigners and were kicked out or sent back to China, but others were so localised that
they couldn’t be expelled. Although a small minority considered the Hadramis as
foreigners, by and large they were considered natives. Not just natives; some of them
were thought to be the most native of the natives, being the leaders of Islam. Once we
think about this in the context of independence, you see very different outcomes
for these communities which all were diasporic and had histories of intermixing
and localisation. Why is it that you have these three very different outcomes upon
independence? That is how I would see the Europeans within this matrix of
intermixing.
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But you also identify many local communities as part of a diaspora.
By doing so, are not you removing them from their indigeneity
and matrilaterality? For you, does indigeneity come only patriarchally?
What I found out was that in all these communities where you have a father who is
Dutch, Chinese, Indian, or Bugis intermarrying local women, the children from that
union are diasporic from the father’s side and indigenous from the mother’s side.
What is strange is that many of these communities originally are quite patrilineal. It
turns out that the mothers were very important. For example, a Chinese coming from
China, fresh off the boat, smart and hardworking: a wealthy, locally established
Chinese Baba has him marry his daughter. The kids take on the mother’s surname or
her father’s name. So what you have is a sort of matriliny emerging.
Although many of these communities are thought of as patrilineal, in fact the
matrilineal or matrilateral aspect is quite important. This is something which I found
out through fieldwork. In the academic literature on the Baba Chinese, the mother’s
side is usually downplayed. Jean Gelman Taylor argues that Batavia was a matriclan
society up to the nineteenth century.3 The women and the women’s networks were
actually the key players. Dutch men, whether they came fromHolland, Sri Lanka, or
Japan, when they came to the Indies it was through their wives that they became
localised and rose up in the ranks. The Arabs have a very similar thing: they say that
al-niswan shabaka (the women are a network). When the Hadramis came to the
region, they also had marriages with local princesses or other local elites, and rose up
in the ranks.
Pertaining to the theme of this special issue, legal history has been
very central to your work, in which there are recurrent references
to the Hadramis moving across borders with legal documents and that
many of them were “concerned rather with hewing to the letter of the law.”
What is law for you in the Indian Ocean context?
First of all, it came as a surprise to me to have anything to do with law and legal
history. As a child, I was always afraid of policemen. Malaysia is one of the most
highly policed states in the world, in terms of the number of policemen per capita.
When I was growing up, the policemen had these Italian cars called Alfa Romeos
which were very fast. We had only bicycles, so we always tried to avoid the Alfa
Romeos. We always ran away from the law.
When I started looking at the Hadramis I was not interested in law at all, but I soon







īn by Nawawī that was very popular among Hadramis, but it is
essentially a legal book. There are discussions in it about certain dilemmas, such as
what do you wipe yourself with when going to the bathroom in the desert? To me it
was strange that this was law, because no policeman is going to come after you, no
156 Mahmood Kooria and Sanne Ravensbergen
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0165115318000232
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Walaeus Library LUMC, on 24 Oct 2019 at 12:19:14, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
judge was going to have a court case over how you wiped yourself in the desert or
jungle. This changed my idea of what law is about. The Hadramis wrote a lot about
law, but they also practised Sufism whether in rituals or in writings. In Islamic studies
it is often said that law and Sufism are at odds with one another. But here
I encountered people who were prime exponents of both. By studying the Hadramis
I could see how law and Sufism were practised by the same individuals. When I was
following the genealogies, I realised how the same issue could at times look like law,
at times like mysticism.
When and why did you decide to focus on the Hadramis?
There are actually a few different paths which led me to the Hadramis. When I was in
Singapore, I was working as an economist, and according to a survey by the Econo-
mistmagazine at the time, Singapore came in number one as the world’s most boring
city. Working as an economist in the world’s most boring city, I found myself wan-
dering the streets quite often, ending up in the Arab Street area. There, the first thing
I realised was that there was an international world of Islam. The Malay Sultan’s
palace is there, but there is also a Muscat Street and a Bussorah Street; names from
across the Islamic world. It turned out that the Muslims in Singapore actually are
quite a multicultural bunch. What was classified as a Malay neighbourhood was
actually an international Muslim concourse. There are Javanese, Malays, Buginese,
Omanis, Egyptians, and also Hadramis.
I took Arabic classes in the building of aMalay martial arts association (Persatuan
Pencak Silat Singapura) and at one of their ritual gatherings commemorating the
death of a holy man, they gave me a book with his long genealogy. I subsequently
found another book with a similar genealogy from Lamu, East Africa, and one from
Hadramawt as well. This made me realise that in Hadramawt, East Africa and Sin-
gapore a common genealogy existed, which basically connected these three very
different places. That was a revelation.
I also realised that the Hadramis across the Indian Ocean were in all those places
that the British had been in as well. This provided the opportunity to, in a sense, redo
the lens of British colonialism, but through the eyes of an Arabic community or
diaspora which had been present in all these places but in a very different social
position. This was quite a different way of looking at colonialism and decolonialism,
and on a very big scale. The Hadramis showed how native eyes were not just local
eyes, and how they actually could be very international and cosmopolitan eyes.
Altogether, studying the Hadramis offered an interesting intellectual challenge.
They had histories that were found in manuscripts and one could study them across
the Indian Ocean. And they provided a different way of understanding and inter-
preting the international society through native eyes, not native of a small place, but
of the whole Indian Ocean region.4
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In your writings, the Hadramis appear as a single bloc, either as
collaborators with or rebels against the Portuguese, Dutch, British, and the
American colonisers or empires. By doing this, are not you making centuries-
long and countries-wide struggles into that of a single diaspora-versus-empire
story?
That is a very good question. One of the things which interested me about the
Hadramis initially was that if you looked at one family, there were family members in
different parts of the world. They were speaking very different languages and living in
very different places. In one family, there can be Africans, Arabs, andMalays. In that
sense, the Hadramis are like the United Nations within one family. To me, coming
from racialised Malaysia, to encounter this sort of explosion of identities and lan-
guages within one family was hugely liberating. This was the interest that drove me.
You are right to say that the article “View from the Other Boat” about Bin Laden
versus the United States seems to create a view of the Hadramis as one bloc fighting
Europeans and later Americans for over five hundred years.5 Yet, I think that this
idea of a bloc actually is one that only arises in certain critical moments in history and
is a product of someone who is able to travel, to recognise familiarities and simila-
rities, and who is able to marshal what are actually very different agendas, very
different contexts, very different backgrounds, into one agenda. It is not one bloc, but
it is someone of this diasporic community who recognises possibilities across the
ocean, and attempts to mobilise them into one movement.
You wrote the article shortly after 9/11 while being based at an American
university. What were the responses you received after publication?
When 9/11 happened, I was actually in the library looking at old colonial documents
where British officials were trying to figure out why some of the Hadramis were going
from Java to Aden, and whether they were “good” or “bad” Arabs. Someone called
me to watch a small television in the library and I saw the planes crashing into the
buildings. Then it turned out that behind it was an Arab, Bin Laden, someone from
the Hadrami community. It hit me like a sucker punch. I was doing very historical
work and suddenly reality hit me. I could not help but start working on this very
contemporary phenomenon.
I was looking not just at the Hadrami diaspora, but also at the English as a
diaspora. I was trying to figure out basically two diasporas: one Anglo, one Arab.
One became an empire and one became anti-imperial. Although they actually had a
lot to do with each other historically, I wondered at what point were they partners and
at what point did the partners fall out? Which is exactly the story of the Bin Ladens
and the Bushes, because they were partners in business and they fell out after 9/11. So
essentially this was not about two different ethnic, racial, religious or cultural blocs
against each other. Rather, this was about people who very closely associated with
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each other as partners in business who then fell out with each other – on a great
civilisational scale, we were made to believe.
I received various kinds of responses to the article. In my own anthropology
department at Harvard there was only deafening silence. I was also involved in the
Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies and there the reception of the
piece was much better. The head of that academy was Samuel Huntington, well
known for his book The Clash of Civilisations. He invited me to present the piece and
I got a lot of vigorous responses, including from someone who used to be in the CIA.
I had argued that one of the reasons 9/11 happened was that the United States had
brought a lot of arms, especially Stinger missiles, into Afghanistan to fight the
Soviets, as part of a project to use Islam as a weapon. But after the Afghan war the
Americans hadn’t bought back those missiles or deweaponised the place. They did
not clean up after themselves. Huntington’s friend, who was the ex-CIA officer,
looked at Sam, they both muttered and said: “Yes, there we made a mistake.” Sub-
sequently, I received a lot of invitations to present my piece in other places. I think it
somehow struck a chord. At that moment, I felt that historical knowledge and context
could help one think quite concretely about very contemporary phenomena.
Looking back at the article now, more than fifteen years after writing it and
identifying the United States as an “invisible empire,” how do you observe
current American interventions in the Middle East, Yemen in particular?
There is a funny way in which the imperial powers flip things backwards. Marx said
that ideology is like a camera obscura or a pinhole camera: it is the truth, but upside
down. The image reverses. When American politicians talk about Islamic terrorism,
they talk about invisible cells, about Bin Laden putting out secret and coded messages
to his followers in televised videos. The dominant conviction is that these Muslim
networks are quite invisible. This was exactly my analysis of the American empire.
One of the important things that can be done now is to show that. Because, if you
for example look down the Swahili coast in East Africa, all these Arab and Muslim
communities are targeted by both Americans and local governments in terms of
surveillance, imprisonment, interrogation, torture, and so on. These communities are
considered to be highly suspect. History and anthropology can show that these
communities are not hidden or invisible. They are historical populations who have
been there for hundreds of years. And yes, they have all these connections with each
other. And yes, at some moments these connections can be mobilised. As Bin Laden
has done. As Abd al-Rahman al-Zahir had done between Aceh, Malabar, the Hejaz,
and Istanbul. As Sayyid Fadl did from Malabar through Yemen to Istanbul. Yes,
there were these Hadrami figures who were able to mobilize followers. But the
communities as a whole are not at all hidden nor illicit. They are these actual, his-
torical, legitimate communities which involve men, women, children, sometimes
sultans, lawyers, and human rights activists. They are interlinked and diasporic, but
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they are legitimate communities. They can be studied and understood. And the simple
fact of their spread does not mean that you should go round up or shoot whomever
you think is an Arab or a Muslim. That is simply ridiculous.
Your work has been central to the field of Indian Ocean Studies. More
recently, you have also been actively engaging in the relatively new field of
Inter-Asian Studies. How are these two fields functioning in relation to each
other?
I see Indian Ocean Studies as an early model, which has successfully demonstrated
over the past thirty years how deep and wide connections can be across two places
that are actually quite far from each other. Oceans in general (Mediterranean and
Atlantic Ocean studies have shown the same) have proved to be productive labora-
tories for thinking about how distant societies can be connected to one another.6
More recently, scholars who work on continents have started to see the value of
placing importance on these far-flung connections. The notion of the openness of
interconnections is, to me, a key idea that has now been taken up as well by those who
work on land and territory.
To bring it back to our earlier discussion on diasporas, what has become very clear
to me is that diasporas are not exceptional. Diasporas are normal. As I mentioned
before, Malaysia only became racialised after the British took over, and that pro-
duced the idea that mixed populations such as mixed Chinese or Malays are a strange
phenomenon. Yet if you go back in history they were the norm. It is normal for
people fromMalabar to live in the Persian Gulf or in Java or the Malay Peninsula. It
is normal for Bugis to be not only in Sulawesi, but in the Moluccaas and even in
Johor.7 It is not exceptional and they are not foreign intruders. It is normal for Jews to
live among gentiles, among Greeks, among Europeans, rather than to be confined to
a small piece of land that was home two thousand years ago. The norm is actually
that people are spread out, not that they stay back home.
This presents an idea of a very mobile world, but many communities—the
majority, the subaltern—are not necessarily mobile. Where does this leave
the study of immobility?
The majority of South Asian scholars, following subaltern or postcolonial thought,
took on a territorial approach that looks at the masses and the downtrodden peasants
and their relations with the central state. This happened in the context of postcolonial
independence, within a Nehruvian project, and I would say also in the context of
American fears of peasant revolts leading to communism. It also tended to take for
granted the unfinished British project of unifying the subcontinent by analysing the
princely states as conservatives without true power; hollow crowns. There is a much
smaller stream of South Asian scholars who did not focus on the territory but on the
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sea surrounding South Asia. They gave a very different view of India; a view from the
boat. The inter-Asia venture I think is essentially the last stage of decolonisation.
Inter-Asian connections precede colonialism, have a lot to say about colonialism,
and have lessons for us in the postcolonial period. The current rise of China has to do
with supply chains, and they reconnect Asian countries to one another. Before
colonialism there were many intense, deep ties between the different Asian regions. It
could be a small village in Kerala and a small village in Malaya. It is not all big scale
but it was intense and longstanding. In the late colonial period these Asian countries
became tied not to each other but to the colonial metropolis. Malaysians went to
London, Indonesians went to Amsterdam, and others went to Lisbon and so on.
These links to the Metropole still exist.
What has been happening across Asia in the past thirty years is the reknitting and
strengthening of these Asian connections.What inWilly Brandt’s terms is called South-
South relations is actually a big historical development. It is the last stage of decolo-
nisation and we don’t quite have the concepts for it. One recent concept is globalisation
but that is not exactly it. These phenomena are happening at a lower level than glo-
balisation. We need to think of precolonial relations and of intermediate scales.
Is this why you criticise research projects and dissertation committees that
have a preference for smaller case studies? Do you consider this a barrier
for conducting “thick transregionalism”?
Yes, one of the good things that has happened in the past two decades is something
called globalisation. Before, the anthropologist would study the village, and the vil-
lage was somehow seen as representative of the country. The mantra was, we look
small but we understand big things. But I think that if you look at small things, you
will understand small things. You might not be able to understand the big things.
I have never wanted to be stuck in one place or one time. I find it very claustrophobic
to be stuck in a small place.
I tell my students: you need at least two places and at least two languages. And before
you can connect them you need to know the two languages and the two places. You do
not just do transnationalism or globalisation, because it is the rage today. You do it if
you have a phenomenon which actually goes across these geographies over time. Most
of my students work on Islamic societies which are spread out in at least two places, but
they also study them over time. It is over time that a lot of data are generated.
Your book Graves of Tarim is a beautiful read, not only for your narratives,
but also for its narration. You master the aesthetics of writing along with the
ethnography of aesthetics. What are the things you pay heed to while you
write?
People often think that when we do big space and big time we go abstract. And to me
that is not what it is about. It is about following your nose. It is about going
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someplace you have never been and recognising things which you know from
somewhere else.
I do not have literary pretensions, but there are anthropologists who write very
aesthetically, such as NancyMunn. She was at the University of Chicago, where they
believed that theory and ethnography have to be blended so well that you can’t see the
seam between the two. I think the way to blend it is within an aesthetic sense that
comes out of the explication of place. Big abstract concepts of social science or
historical agendas are hard to perceive. One can actually perceive them when one can
smell them. When we go to Yemen and see these houses from mud. If they are well
maintained they are white and bright, if they are not well maintained they melt into
the earthern landscape, like the fine dust of the wadi (valley) in your nostrils. It is this
sense of place which I try to capture in my writing. It is the sense of smell that I try to
bring across in writing.
Once you really understand a place you can actually sniff out or sense things
coming from elsewhere. And it is this meld of things from elsewhere and things very
native to a place that captures my imagination. All these distant connections are not
something abstract but they have to be something which you can feel and recognise in
a visceral sense. That is something I want to convey to readers; to give a sense of how
people participate in being connected to far-flung places. They often do not really
have a sense that it is unusual, they just live their life. I want to convey how normal
such an experience can be, to be in connection with relatives from far away and
ancestors from many generation and centuries ago.
Which inter-Asia connections are you following at the moment? Where is
your nose leading you next?
Recently I have been trying to figure out what different kinds of concepts we need for
studying inter-Asia connections, rather than following internal contradictions, to
study them in a central rather than a marginal way.8 Others are, I think, sensing
similar things and want to articulate them. It will be a collective scholarly enterprise.
I am also thinking about how space and time can be coordinated but can also be
disconnected. Amitav Ghosh made a very nice analogy when he said that history is
like a river running in one direction, but that he is interested in the fish swimming in
all different directions. I think this is a very nice way of putting it. Lives are not linear
in the historical sense. How can one go back in time while moving in space? I think
that it is the fish that I am currently quite intrigued by. The fish are the old diasporas,
the Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Chinese, Hadramis. They have historical experiences
and collective memories which span many different continents and oceans. I am
intrigued by how these communities, when they travel in space, can also travel
in time.
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